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Abstract The election of Donald J. Trump as the 45th President of the United
States reminded us that climate deniers are anything but endangered species. In this
short paper, we discuss President Trump’s position on climate change in the wider
context of climate controversies and denial. In particular, we put it into perspective
with other notorious contrarian leaders and their influence on national and inter-
national climate politics. Finally, we provide a brief analysis of President Trump
discourses on climate change and discuss them in light of reflections about post-
truth politics.
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The election of Donald J. Trump as the 45th President of the United States sadly
reminded us that climate deniers are anything but endangered species, particularly
as country leaders. While many environmental scholars thought (or wished) that his
views would soften after his election—during his campaign, Trump went as far as to
promise to pull the U.S. out of the Paris Agreement—his first appointments and
statements after taking office were no less reassuring as he hardly acknowledged
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‘some connectivity’ between human activity and climate change and confirmed that
he will be ‘[…] looking at it very closely [and] […] [wi]ll let you know’ (New York
Times 2016). The new President is, however, not an exception. In this short piece,
we situate his views in the context of climate controversies and in the network of
powerful actors that, for decades, have fueled climate denial, particularly in the U.S.
Then, we draw attention to the role of contrarian politicians at top level positions in
stalling the national and international climate debates.
Two Decades of Climate-Denial
Far from being a recent phenomenon, the rejection of the scientific consensus on
climate change emerged more or less at the same time as environmental problems
were put on the international agenda. McCright and Dunlap (2001) were among the
first to study the appearance in the early 1990s of a ‘countermovement’ supported
by conservative think tanks with the explicit aim to counter the endorsement of the
Kyoto Protocol by the U.S. (a rather successful endeavour as the country never
ratified it). In the following decade, a multitude of studies were produced to describe
these groups and the strategies they used to influence public views and decision-
making.
Various terms have been used to describe the individuals or groups that question
the scientific consensus about anthropogenic climate change. Some scholars have
argued that this attitude should be distinguished from ‘scepticism’ that is an inherent
and ‘healthy’ characteristic of science (Mann 2012, p. 26; Dunlap 2013) and
recommended ‘deniers’ or ‘contrarians’ for those who reject all evidence of
anthropogenic climate change. It has also been argued that public views are not
sceptical, but rather ambivalent or simply unconcerned (Poortinga et al. 2011).
Scholars have also distinguished several types of deniers: those who reject all
evidence of global warming; those who believe human activities are not causing
global warming; those who accept the reality of global warming but claim that its
impacts will be minor, if not beneficial; and those who question the economic and
political measures proposed to deal with it (McCright and Dunlap 2000; Rahmstorf
2004; Hoffman 2011). Often, deniers hold a mix of these beliefs.
Researchers have exposed the great diversity of protagonists behind the
disinformation campaigns aimed at spreading doubts, ‘keeping the controversy
alive’ and ‘manufactur[ing] uncertainty’ (Oreskes and Conway 2010; Hoggan 2009;
Powell 2011; Dunlap 2013). They identified a loose coalition gathering the fossil
fuel industry (e.g. Koch Industries and ExxonMobil), a number of conservative
foundations and think-tanks (e.g. the Heartland and George C. Marshall Institutes)
and traced their financial support to ‘a range of front groups and Astroturf
operations’ (Dunlap 2013, p. 692). These groups also benefited from the support of
conservative media and politicians, as their arguments resonated well with the anti-
regulatory stance of the U.S. Republican Party and later of the Tea Party. In
challenging mainstream climate science, these groups could also count on the
support of a few recognized scientists (Oreskes and Conway 2010). These scientists
(e.g. Fred Seitz and Fred Singer) were physicists having served for decades in high
K. De Pryck, F. Gemenne
123
Author's personal copy
levels of science administration, that felt at odds with growing environmental
concerns and the introduction of new modes of knowledge production, in particular
climate models (Lahsen 2008, 2013).
This ‘denial machine’ has its roots in the activities that the Tobacco Industry
carried out in the 1950s to counter the mounting evidence of the link between
cigarettes and lung cancer (Oreskes and Conway 2010). Likewise, the objective of
climate deniers has been to challenge the scientific consensus on human-induced
climate change and propagate the idea that the science is not settled. This was in
turn used to argue against the necessity to take actions that could threaten the
economy (and the interests of high-emission industries). Their strategies ranged
from editing reports, to writing editorials and commentaries in conservative media
and blogs, to appearing on television, and more rarely, to publishing in peer-
reviewed articles (Anderegg et al. 2010). Their arguments could be found in online
publications and were relayed through the press, radio, and television (Oreskes and
Conway 2008). Many media outlets failed to represent the disjuncture between the
scientific consensus and the sceptical claims (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004; Painter
2011).
The focus on science explains why the privileged target of the denier groups has
long been the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the UN body
responsible for assessing scientific knowledge on climate change since 1988. In
1995, one of its leading scientists, Ben Sander, was accused of ‘corruption of the
peer-review process’ regarding a sentence of the Summary for Policymakers (SPM)
of the IPCC Second Assessment Report that stipulated that ‘the balance of evidence
suggests that there is a discernible human influence on global climate’ (Edwards and
Schneider 1997, p. 3). In 2001, the organization came under fire again for displaying
in its Third Assessment Report the famous ‘hockey stick graph’ by Mann et al.
(1999), which would become an icon in the climate change debate (Mann 2012).
Finally, the biggest wave of criticism came in 2009 when errors were found in the
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, only a few weeks after the breaking of the
‘Climategate’ controversy (which supposedly exposed the ‘impure’ and ‘biased’
nature of climate science through the diffusion of emails stolen from the Climatic
Research Unit at the University of East Anglia).
The view of science and politics that underpins climate denial is that of the so-
called ‘linear model’ according to which scientific knowledge, produced in an
untainted and non-political manner, is transmitted to policymakers and supports
their informed decisions (Pielke 2007). While the linear model is simplistic, it still
remains anchored in public perceptions and offers a weak spot for sceptical attacks
(Sarewitz 2010). By emphasizing the situated and socially embedded nature of
climate science, contrarians aimed to raise doubts about scientific consensus and
thereby undermine the justification of climate policies.
Likewise, as it provides a rather advantageous way of dividing responsibilities
between scientists and policymakers, the linear model is not challenged by
policymakers. According to this model, the former are responsible for delivering
facts and the latter for making value judgments based on those facts (Pielke 2007).
However, in the face of the increasingly complex and uncertain nature of
transnational environmental problems (‘super wicked’ problems according to Levin
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et al. 2012), that arrangement between science and politics has become less and less
tenable. According to Latour (2012), the scientists under attack—but also those that
supported them—have been hoisted by their own petard as they have always
insisted on the virtue of scepticism and on the need to keep science isolated from
politics.
Contrarian Leaders
The stances of President Trump on many issues are often so outrageous that one
could think they are isolated on the international stage. Yet this is far from being the
case. First, Trump is not the first sceptical politician to hold the presidency or
government of a country. Former U.S. President George W. Bush (2001–2009) has
already been criticized for undermining climate science and refusing to ratify the
Kyoto Protocol (Dunlap and McCright 2008). More recently, former Australian
Prime Minister (2013–2015), Tony Abbott, also emerged as a convinced climate
contrarian and stated in his book Battlelines that ‘whether humans have had a
significant impact on the climate as a whole is much less clear. Climate change is a
relatively new political issue, but it’s been happening since the earth’s beginning’
(Abbott 2009, p. 169). Abbott came forward as a fierce opponent of climate policies
that would, in his view, hurt the Australian economy. Canada’s former Prime
Minister, Stephen Harper (2006–2015), shared a similar view. During his tenure, he
officially maintained that climate change is a major threat for future generations, but
his country pulled out of the Kyoto Protocol claiming that it did ‘not represent the
path forward for a global solution to climate change [but an] impediment’, as it did
not include major emitters like China and the U.S. (in the words of Peter Kent,
former Minister of the Environment—The Guardian 2011). Another lesser-known
contrarian is former Czech President, Vaclav Klaus (2003–2013), who compared
global warming to communism (Klaus 2010). Klaus was particularly close to
American contrarian lobbies and attended several conferences organized by the
conservative think-tank Heartland Institute. Former French President Nicolas
Sarkozy also seemed to ride the wave of denial recently, suggesting, during the
primary elections, that climate change was not primarily caused by human activities
(Dagorn 2016). These politicians share similar views about climate science and they
all have an acute sense that climate policies would damage their national
economies. Like the majority of politicians in the Western world, they also have
in common that they are all conservative white men (McCright and Dunlap 2011).
The experience of the U.S. under Bush, of Canada under Harper, and of Australia
under Abbott showed that these politicians have used various strategies to divert
public and political attention away from climate change policies. This can be done
by appointing climate deniers at the head of scientific agencies, abolishing advisory
panels and scientific programmes, cutting funding to environment portfolios as well
as reorienting research towards more industry-relevant research (Hoag 2012). More
troubling are the growing accusations of censorship by federal scientists during
Harper’s mandate who needed approval to communicate their research to media,
particularly for issues related to climate change and the environment (Ogden 2016).
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Some commentators even spoke of ‘Canada’s war on science’ (Turner 2014).
Depending on the responsibilities allowed by the constitution of their country and
the contextual distribution of power, these leaders may have more or less influence
in stalling the debate. At a minimum, their position can allow them a ‘bully pulpit’
to expose their views and influence the debate. The symbolic power of these leaders
can help to mainstream climate contrarian opinions.
Donald J. Trump is walking in the steps of his predecessors. He appointed at the
head of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the federal agency responsible
for the protection of human health and the environment, Scott Pruitt, known for
having led several lawsuits against the EPA. Pruitt recently claimed that human
activity is not the primary contributor to global warming (DiChristopher 2017).
Trump also nominated Rex Tillerson, former CEO of ExxonMobil, as Secretary of
State. A bill was introduced a week after Trump’s inauguration to cut financial
contributions to the IPCC, the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework—Convention
on Climate Change), and the Green Climate Fund—the former had already been
subjected to major cuts in 2011. He also recently signed an order to undo the Clean
Power Plan supported by his predecessor, Barack Obama, which aimed at cutting
greenhouse gas emissions from power plants. President Trump has made it clear that
there are much more important environmental issues than climate change such as
clean water, diseases, and food production, and that the environment comes after the
competitiveness of the country (New York Times 2016; see McGee 2017 for a
discussion of Donald J. Trump’s political ecology).
Post-truth and Trump
If President Trump’s views on climate change are not different from contrarian
arguments, the way in which he voices his opinions is distinctive. To explore his
position, we relied on the Trump Twitter Archive1 and the New York Times
interview transcript (2016). To some extent, climate sceptics were ‘playing the
game of science’ in the sense that they advanced their claims while abiding to the
forms of scientific debate (i.e. making the effort to disguise pseudo-evidence as
‘scientific’ facts). This is rarely so in President Trump’s case and questions can be
raised about the revival of climate-denial in a ‘post-truth’ context. In that context,
‘facts no longer provide a compelling epistemic base for presenting and resolving
disputes. Instead, a partisan base provides the discursive and institutional support
for a parallel universe of alt-news, alt-facts, and alt-reality’ (Lynch 2017).
Accordingly, scientific claims on climate can be dismissed or weakened by
reference to personal beliefs: what President Trump calls ‘keeping an open-mind’
(New York Times 2016). According to him, cold and snowy days are enough
evidence to dismiss global warming. When asked about whether he believed in
climate change, Trump (New York Times 2016) referred to his uncle (an MIT
engineer) saying that he ‘had a feeling on [climate change]. It’s a very complex
subject. I’m not sure anybody is ever going to really know’ (note the reference to
1 http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com/.
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feelings instead of scientific evidence). Above all, Trump seems to base his opinion
on climate change on whether it is economically viable or not:
I think right now … well, I think there is some connectivity [between climate
change and human activities]. […] It depends on how much. It also depends
on how much it’s going to cost our companies. You have to understand, our
companies are noncompetitive right now. (New York Times 2016, emphasis
added).
Trump rarely provides sources for his positions on Twitter and, when he does, he
refers to media and blogs (e.g. Wall Street Journal and wattsupwiththat.com both
have proved sympathetic to contrarian voices). Trump’s arguments are a mix of
personal beliefs, lies (‘alternative facts’ in his view) and conspiracy theories. He
regularly suggests that scientists purposely adopted the term climate change instead
of global warning because ‘it did not work anymore’. He also mentioned the
Climategate emails (New York Times 2016) and tweeted in 2012 that ‘global
warming is based on faulty science and manipulated data which is proven by the
emails that were leaked’. He even claimed that climate change was a Chinese
conspiracy, a concept ‘created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S.
manufacturing non-competitive’.
It is too early to say whether Trump will be able to dismantle the engagements
undertaken by the international community and the U.S. in recent years (particularly
in the 2015 Paris Agreement). At COP222 in Marrakech, U.S. diplomats did their
very best to convince their colleagues that ‘nothing could stop the momentum’, and
that the market and economic forces had already started their transformation
towards sustainability. Overall, diplomats—and not only American diplomats—
downplayed the importance of the U.S. presidential election for the future of the
international cooperation on the fight against climate change, as if politics did not
matter anymore. In our opinion, that is a foolish view. And whether the U.S.
remains a party to the Paris Agreement or not the damage is already done. First, the
mere fact that a candidate openly sceptical on climate science can get elected to the
very top office of a major emitter of greenhouse gas shows that climate change is
not yet a priority for the electorate. Second, the Paris Agreement is a symbolic,
political declaration: an important one, but with no binding commitments. The real
test will lie in the capacity of all countries to upgrade their commitments in the
years to come. And even if the U.S. remains party to the agreement, it seems clear
that the country will not commit to drastic emissions’ reductions in the future—yet
this is absolutely needed, from the U.S. and many other countries. And the views of
President Trump, alas, are not isolated on the international scene: without going as
far as questioning the reality of climate change, many governments are very
reluctant to implement meaningful climate action. Trump’s election will not
encourage a different approach. As the principle of universality is the cornerstone of
the Paris Agreement, it seems difficult to imagine that countries like Russia, Japan
2 The 22nd Conference of the Parties (COP 22) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC).
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or Australia would upgrade their commitments if the U.S. does not. And this alone
could ruin the ambition of the Paris Agreement.
This shows that consequences of having contrarian politicians elected at top level
positions loom large. The fact that the President of the United States, and other
world leaders, are rejecting climate science is not anecdotal or trivial. Yet to this
day, very few studies exist on the impact of contrarian leaders on international and
domestic climate policies. Standing up against an administration, even in an
academic way, can be costly, as governments can sometimes have significant
influence on research funding and scientific careers. In the coming years, it will be
crucial to investigate if and how the system of checks-and-balances defuses
Trump’s denial—as many observers hoped at COP22 in Marrakech.
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